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Introduction 
For a variety of reasons, largely to do with significant global geo-political events, recent 
academic scholarly activity in public relations (PR) has turned its attention to analyzing 
issues such as the relationship between PR and terrorism (Richards, 2004), terrorism and 
crisis management in the US (Wright, 2004; Ulmer and Sellow, 2002), the uses of PR 
tactics by armed state and non-state actors (Loew, 2003) and government PR in response 
to terrorism (Hiebert, 2005; Zhang, 2007). This study aims to contribute to this growing 
body of knowledge, and the emerging critical debate on PR in conflict and post-conflict 
contexts, by focusing on the role and use of  PR strategies by the IRA (Irish Republican 
Army) and their political wing Sinn Féin (who for much of the period known as the 
Northern Ireland „Troubles‟ was a proscribed illegal organisation). The analysis of 
IRA/Sinn Féin PR strategy will examine the use of what Gerry Adams (Sinn Féin 
President) described as „spectaculars‟, their day-to-day publicity efforts, their foreign and 
domestic media relations and their internal organizational communication. Public 
relations „turning points‟ will be analysed in relation to key historical events including 
Bloody Sunday, Internment, the Hunger Strikes, censorship and the broadcasting ban, 
and finally the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. A key aim of the study is to trace the 
transformation in Sinn Féin‟s PR as the organisation made the transition from political 
wing and public face of republican terrorism to mainstream political party or, as Spencer 
(2006) put it, “from political pariah into a party which is representative of democratic 
change and peace in Northern Ireland” (p. 356). In many ways this is an important PR 
(hi)story and it is without doubt a key story in any attempt to analyse the period  known 
as the Northern Ireland „Troubles‟.  
As noted above, recent academic scholarly activity in PR (and for a considerably 
longer period in media studies and political communication) has turned its attention to 
analyzing issues surrounding terrorism and PR. This is a significant body of work which 
is important in helping to develop a critical understanding of the role and function of PR 
in contemporary society. It should be noted that much of this recent analysis of terrorism, 
PR and the media reiterates the „propaganda of the deed‟ (Picard, 1989; Loew, 2005) 
explanations of terrorist activities which echoes the work of scholars like Laqueur (1977) 
who noted that: “Terrorists have learned that the media are of paramount importance in 
their campaigns, that the terrorist act by itself is next to nothing, whereas publicity is all” 
(p. 223). We begin our analysis with a discussion of the key theoretical and conceptual 
issues as they are articulated in the literature on the relationship between terrorism and 
PR before moving on to discuss the perspectives of the participants interviewed in this 
study. Key events and critical incidents are used to contextualise our interview data and 
help build understanding of important changes within the republican movement and the 
accompanying PR developments throughout the historical period under review. 
Theoretical background 
Defining terrorism 
Any discussion of terrorism, as with most controversial topics, cannot get very far 
without an engagement with definitional issues. In a classic work on terrorism and the 
media Schlesinger et al (1983) argue that the mass media is the forum where different 
perspectives on „terrorism‟ struggle for dominance in contemporary liberal democratic 
societies. PR resources are utilized by proponents of the different perspectives in an 
attempt to influence media representations and ultimately public perceptions of terrorism. 
Schlesinger et al (1983) identify two of the key perspectives as the „Official‟ perspective 
and the „Alternative‟ perspective. The official perspective is articulated by those who 
speak for the „State‟ (e.g. government ministers, conservative politicians, top security 
„experts‟ etc) and while not always a coherent set of ideas it tends to stress terrorism‟s 
criminality and sometimes argues that responding to the „threat‟ of terrorism may require 
suspending due process (for example, the right to trial). The official perspective therefore 
usually tends to seek to present the „terrorist‟ as beyond the bounds of acceptable 
behaviour, that is, as either criminals or madmen. Schlesinger et al (1983) note that what 
they term the „alternative‟ perspective is articulated by those who dissent from the 
official view of terrorism but accept that violence is not legitimate within liberal-
democracies (e.g. civil libertarians, critical academics, some journalists, some 
politicians). The alternative perspective treats the term „terrorism‟ as partial, a term 
which tends to be harnessed for propaganda purposes but which explains very little. For 
Chomsky and Herman (1979) the terms terror and terrorism “have become semantic 
tools of the powerful in the Western world” (p. 85). They argue that terrorism is 
widespread in the contemporary world but that it is important to recognize the distinction 
between „wholesale terror‟ produced by State actors and „retail terror‟ produced by small 
groups. More recently Best et al (2007) adopt and update this „alternative‟ view when 
they point out that: ““Terrorism” has become an increasingly ubiquitous part of everyday 
life, and yet the meaning of the term proves to be elusive” (p.6). This is, they note:  
[L]argely because “terrorism” is a highly loaded, complex, and malleable term 
whose use and meaning are influenced by emotion, political ideology, and even 
culture. All too often, its sense depends on those who monopolize the means of 
communication … Speakers routinely brand their adversaries as “terrorists” in 
order to discredit their opponents and avoid inquiry into the conditions that 
motivate their actions. …If dissenting individuals or groups are successfully 
demonized as “terrorist”, they are painted as fanatics, as people not to be reasoned 
with, as individuals who need to be dealt with in a harsh or violent way and to 
whom laws and constitutional rights do not apply.‟ (Best et al 2007, p. 6) 
PR literature and terrorism 
What terrorism is, how it is defined and who is defining it is important because 
arguably much recent PR academic literature has tended to adopt what Schlesinger et al 
(1983) would term the „official‟ view. To take one example, in his definition of 
„terrorism‟ Richards (2004) seems to restrict it to what Chomsky and Herman (1979) 
would refer to as „retail terror‟, that is, it is an activity that individuals or small groups, 
not State actors, engage in. In his discussion of the relationship between PR and terrorism 
Richards devotes some space to analyzing the motivation of the „terrorist‟ and again 
arguably reiterates the „official‟ perspective. He notes that “terror can be seen as fuelled 
in part by a sort of madness within the terrorist …a form of psychopathology, indeed as a 
form of psychosis” and he goes on to point out that “the psychotic is incapable of the 
kind of accurate reading of the feelings and perceptions of others which underpins good 
and effective PR” (Richards, 2004, p. 171). Richards largely restricts his analysis of the 
relationship between terrorism and PR to the issues surrounding, and the significance of, 
the September 11
th
 2001 Al Qaeda attack on the World Trade Centre in New York. It 
may be argued that his classification, of terrorists as psychopaths, may have significance 
when applied to those who carried out the atrocities of 9/11 although it should be pointed 
out that many liberal Muslim scholars would disagree with this analysis. For example, 
Mohamed Charfi, the noted Islamic legal scholar and opponent of Islamic 
fundamentalism, noted of the Islamist suicide bomber: “Such a rank-and-file militant is 
the product of a culture and a history, and above all of a particular kind of education” 
(2005, p. 16). This is not to argue that the adoption of violence is a legitimate response 
but rather to point out that an analysis of „terrorism‟ which defines it only as a spectacular 
stunt carried out by small groups of criminals or psychotic militants ultimately lacks any 
real explanatory power or coherence. One could also point out that such a partial 
perspective on „terrorism‟ seems to remove the concept of „state terrorism‟ from the 
debate which no doubt would be welcomed by many governments around the world 
today.  
Interestingly a key early work on PR and terrorism implicitly rejected this notion 
of terrorist PR as the unsophisticated by product of psychopathic behaviour. Picard 
(1989) noted that in respect to academic research and scholarly debate on the topic: 
A significant amount of discussion has been devoted to media activities but most 
of it has assumed terrorist groups to be indirect manipulators of media coverage, 
relying upon their violence to induce coverage and thus help achieve their goals. 
… These discussions, however, have generally ignored the existence of 
significant press relations activities of terrorist organizations that go beyond the 
propaganda of the deed and involve extensive direct contacts with media. (p. 12). 
 
According to the „propaganda of the deed‟ thesis (Laqueur, 1977; Picard, 1989; 
Loew, 2005) the primary aim of the terrorist is to draw attention to their cause by 
engaging in acts of political violence to try to exploit the mass media as a communication 
channel. Picard (1989) however argues that another key, and often ignored, 
communicative activity of many terrorist groups has been publicity efforts to raise public 
awareness and influence public opinion. He notes: “Publicity is an organized form of 
persuasion that attempts to influence opinion by focusing attention on causes, persons, or 
institutions…Terrorists have an advantage in gaining this type of publicity because the 
public and violent nature of their acts guarantees that media will provide some coverage” 
(1989, p.13). He does not however take the view that terrorist groups are exclusively 
engaged in „press agentry‟ PR. According to Picard: 
Labelling perpetrators of terrorism as seekers of publicity for its own sake is 
simplistic and ignores their very significant efforts to direct news coverage to 
present their cause in favourable ways…Some groups plan and implement 
extensive publicity campaigns…[and]…use most of the techniques normally 
employed by public relations professionals‟ (1989, p. 14). 
 
Picard‟s study examines how a range of terrorist groups utilise typical PR tactics 
and employ techniques such as press releases, statements, articles for publications and 
background information in the form of press kits, fact sheets, press conferences, 
interviews, and the provision of visual materials (1989, p. 14).  
Picard articulates a rather different approach to the analysis of terrorist PR and in 
concluding his analysis he makes the observation:    
If a terrorist group has or gains wide popular support, it may be difficult for 
officials to perpetually refuse to deal with its leadership. Some groups, 
understanding the on-going nature of political struggle, begin their activities with 
significant levels of violence, then reduce its scale and replace the propaganda of 
the deed with other forms of publicity and lower levels of violence, and may 
indicate that they will give up perpetrating terrorist acts in exchange for official 
recognition.…Many of the groups are directed by intelligent, well-educated 
individuals who are well aware of the impact of media on public opinion and 
politics. Some receive training and support in their media efforts and many are 
adopting the same publicity techniques used by governments to convey their 
views and messages (Picard 1989, p. 21). 
 
In some ways his comments accurately describe the story of republicanism in Northern 
Ireland from the end of the 1960s to the IRA ceasefire and political peace process of the 
1990s. As we shall see, the notion of the well planned unfolding strategy described above 
does not really reflect the lived experience of those who developed and directed publicity 
and PR activity for the republican movement during the Northern Ireland „Troubles‟. 
Methodology 
The substantive part of this study is based on interview data which was gathered as part 
of the „Northern Ireland PR Oral History Project 2003-2010‟.i This project has as its 
central aim the provision of an archive of interviews from actors in engaged in PR and 
professional communication in the political, economic and social/cultural spheres in 
Northern Ireland since the 1960s. The respondents used for this study are republican 
press officers and political strategists: Danny Morrison, Jim Gibney, Richard McAuley, 
Danny Devenney, Brendan McFarlane and Gerry Adams. The interviews were conducted 
between 2003 and 2007 and on average lasted 45 minutes, they were semi-structured in 
format and the interviewees answered all the questions that were put to them. In these 
elite interviews the participants reflect on the PR strategies and tactics deployed by the 
armed republican movement and articulate their understanding of political PR. The 
interview technique, and in particular the elite/expert interview has both strengths and 
limitations as a research method. Bogner et al (2009) note that “Conducting expert 
interviews can serve to shorten time-consuming data gathering processes, particularly if 
the experts are seen as „crystallization points‟ for practical insider knowledge and are 
interviewed as surrogates for a wider circle of players…expert interviews offer 
researchers an effective means of quickly obtaining results and, indeed, of quickly 
obtaining good results.” (p. 2). There are however several issues to bear in mind when 
conducting the kind of interviews which provided the data for this paper. McEvoy (2006) 
writing about employing the interview method in Northern Ireland cautions “the nature of 
antagonistic politics in a divided society can mean that seemingly straightforward 
questions can provoke adversarial, sectarian responses‟ (p. 185) It is also important to 
make clear, as L‟Etang (2008) points out there is always a risk in conducting elite 
interviews with participants who are “masters and mistresses of impression management” 
(p. 323). Nevertheless, while there is clearly an element of staying „on message‟, all 
interviewees were asked to reflect as individuals on issues raised in the interview and 
many of them did speak candidly about the key decisions surrounding the development of 
republican PR during the „Troubles‟. 
It should also be made clear that this research, like Spencer‟s (2006) study of 
republicans and the media during the 1998 Northern Ireland peace process, was not 
concerned with a textual analysis of the media in order to arrive at some assessment of 
the strengths and limitations of the IRA and Sinn Féin‟s media relations strategies. This 
would be an interesting but quite different study. Our research focused on gathering the 
participants‟ attitudes and perceptions on the role and function of various aspects of PR 
practice; publicity, media relations, organisational communication and issues 
management. As background, this research project also utilized the extensive research 
data on the „Troubles‟ held in the University of Ulster‟s Conflict Archive on the Internet 
(CAIN)  and the resources of the International Conflict Research Institute (INCORE).  
We present our findings below in three sections based on three strategic phases of 
the republican movement‟s involvement in the Northern Ireland „Troubles‟. The three 
sections focus, in turn, on: the use of violence or „armed struggle‟ and the PR activities 
surrounding that (what we term the „propaganda of the deed‟ phase); the development of 
political PR in response to the republican movement‟s decision to engage in electoral 
politics; and thirdly the PR and media relations underpinning the attempts to disengage 
from the „armed struggle‟ and build a peace process in Northern Ireland. These phases 
are in some senses chronological with one strategy de facto replacing the previous one 
but as was noted above our findings indicate that there was no fully worked out strategy 
and in important ways these phases were as reactive to external events as they were 
proactive. It should also be noted that in significant ways these phases overlap, for 
example the IRA was still exploding bombs in London in 1996 during the endgame of 
what was meant to be the peace process phase.   
The research questions which underpinned this study were: 
1. What were the key changes and developments in the PR practice of the 
republican movement over the period of „the Troubles‟? 
2. How did the republican movement manage the PR surrounding „critical 
incidents‟ and key events of „the Troubles‟? 
3. How do the participants understand and define PR? 
Political violence and PR 
„Propaganda of the deed‟ 
A coherent and organised approach to PR within the republican movement took 
time to develop. Despite early British government policy and PR disasters like 
internment
ii
 (indefinite imprisonment without trial) and the „Bloody Sunday‟ massacre 
(where 13 civil rights marchers where shot dead by the British army) republicans failed to 
gain the full propaganda value from these events. Our interviewees were in agreement 
that Sinn Féin/IRA had demonstrated little skill in exploiting these stories outside their 
own „active‟ communities. As Danny Morrison noted “if we, in 1971, had the PR skills 
we had twenty years later we would have ran rings around the British government.” 
Richard McAuley did reflect on the policy decisions of the British Government in terms 
of their PR implications but he notes it was the political and constitutional impacts which 
were viewed as most significant at the time. He states:  
Internment wasn‟t simply a PR disaster for the unionists or for the British, it was a 
political disaster…the British hadn‟t yet managed to get in place entirely this view 
of this conflict as sectarian … and they were here keeping the peace, they were 
still in the early stages of promoting that view of themselves and that view of the 
conflict, so the PR in that sense was a disaster, but it was also a political disaster 
because… although Bloody Sunday is often given as the reason for it I think the 
fact is there is clearly a connection between internment in August ‟71 and the 
prorogation at Stormont in March ‟72.  
 
Interestingly, McAuley also points here to what could be described as the British 
Government‟s initial failure to „frame‟ the conflict as sectarian strife with the British 
military offering a peace-keeping role. Entman (1993) notes that the process of framing is 
in essence “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendations for the item 
described” (p. 51). McAuley, like several other participants in this study, was very 
familiar with the concept of „framing‟ and its use in constructing a narrative or discourse 
about the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The battle over what frame to use to explain the 
conflict would be played out over the subsequent decades and is particularly evident in 
the media relations of both sides.  
In these early days some media relations opportunities were successfully 
organised like the Ballymurphy press call organised by Gerry Adams to declare that the 
IRA were still intact despite internment (August 9
th
, 1971). While such events showed the 
“media and PR skills that were to follow” on the whole most opportunities were stifled 
by lack of experience (Moloney 2007, p. 101). Arguably it is also the case that while the 
political chaos left by the collapsing institutions of unionist rule could have been 
exploited to a wider audience more skilfully to the advantage of the republican cause the 
reality was that the violence was ratcheted up on all sides and this resulted in the 
republican movement primarily communicating through the „propaganda of the deed‟ 
(Picard, 1989; Loew, 2005). McAuley articulates this perspective when he reflects on the 
IRA bombing campaign which characterised the 1970s; 
[E]very operation that the IRA carried out wasn‟t just about that operation, it was 
about the political affect that operation would have in conjunction with all the 
others and also the propaganda factor would happen, it was often said that one 
IRA action, one bomb attack in London was worth 100 here, because over the 
years the international media, unless some huge atrocity happened, the media 
tended to ignore this place whereas if something happened in London it became 
headlines around the world.   
 
The IRA accompanied their attacks, as most terrorist organisations do with 
statements to the press and it is clear that there was frequently a conscious attempt to 
create sound-bites for the media. After the assassination of the Duke of Edinburgh‟s 
uncle, Lord Louis Mountbatten on the 27
th
 August, 1979, and then later that day the 
killing of 18 British soldiers in roadsides bombs, wall murals sprang up in Belfast which 
read “13 gone and not forgotten (a reference to those killed on Bloody Sunday), we got 
18 and Mountbatten.” Danny Devenney, who designed the Republican News newspaper 
and was also in charge of co-ordinating wall murals in Belfast during this period, noted 
that this was very effective way to get the republican message across. He suggests: “You 
have to follow Saatchi and Saatchi‟s theory of advertising, the best murals are the one‟s 
with the simplest message, so people drive on and get the message immediately… They 
might agree or disagree with the point you‟re trying to make, but at least it has soaked 
through into their consciousness.”  
However the urge to vary the „spectaculars‟ to keep the media interested also 
brought tragedy for ordinary citizens as well as PR disasters for the republican 
movement. One of the most devastating came on the 8
th
 November 1987 when the IRA 
planted a 40lb bomb in Enniskillen as people gathered for a Remembrance Sunday 
service at the town‟s war memorial. The blast killed 13 and injured 63, 19 of them 
seriously. Danny Morrison remembers that in the immediate aftermath Sinn Féin 
spokesmen appeared in the media to express „regret‟ but they stopped giving interviews 
soon after the event because “to attempt to explain it or put it in context would have 
appeared to have been justifying it.” Reflecting on Enniskillen and previous tragic 
blunders by the IRA Morrison stated: 
I was the first Sinn Féin representative to do an interview after Enniskillen and it 
was on Talkback [BBC radio] and it was about half an hour long and it was 
extremely difficult. First of all I wasn‟t going to defend what happened and 
couldn‟t defend what happened. And there were other incidents like that down the 
years. Le Mon when twelve people were, a bomb went off, and they were burnt to 
death. Horrific deaths, you can‟t put a gloss on things like that.  
 
Picard (1989) suggests that a distinction can be drawn between terrorist PR and 
„normal‟ PR practice. He notes: “Publicity of negative information is usually not sought 
by PR practitioners, but it is clearly sought by terrorist groups, and its effect must differ 
from publicity of positive information” (1989, p. 13). Arguably this can be seen to be 
only partially true in the case of Sinn Féin spokesmen defending IRA violence. On some 
occasions, as Morrison states, they disengaged from media relations altogether and 
withdrew from attempts to employ the language of apology typical of state and non-state 
actors when they cause civilian casualties during conflict.  
Media censorship 
PR disasters involving the slaughter of innocent civilians were damaging for the 
republican movement, which relied on projecting the key frame that they were the 
innocent oppressed group suffering at the hands of British state violence and political 
repression. However a much more significant issue in respect to communicating with 
audiences outside Northern Ireland was the increasing levels of British government 
censorship in respect to press coverage of the conflict. At the beginning of the Troubles 
„pressure‟ was exerted by the British government in various ways upon the media 
covering the developing conflict in Northern Ireland. So much so that in late 1971, 200 
mainly British journalists met to sign a „declaration of intent‟ about “the intensification of 
censorship on TV, radio and the press coverage of events in Northern Ireland and pledge 
ourselves to oppose it” (CAIN – The British Media in Ireland: 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/media/docs/freespeech.htm). Although there was no legal 
ban on coverage at this time, according to all of our interviewees, British government 
pressure on the media, along with their own lack of communication skills, did have a 
significant negative impact their ability to convey their message to external audiences.  
A recognition of the difficulties in getting their message across to the mainstream 
mass media led by the mid-1970s to a much more focused attempt to organise and 
improve republican PR and media relations. The first significant initiative was the 
establishment of the press centre on the Falls Road in Belfast. As Curtis (1984) points 
out, it wasn‟t long before ”the telex machine was put to increasing use, and became a 
crucial tool, allowing republicans to convey their version of incidents immediately to the 
press, and for the first time enabling them to compete seriously with the various British 
PR operations” (p. 265). Secondly, a highly skilled media manager, Danny Morrison, had 
taken over the editorship of the Republican News on his release from internment in 1975 
and later, in 1979, became Sinn Féin Director of Publicity. Morrison explains his role in 
terms that most PR practitioners would understand: 
[J]ournalists are particularly lazy people. So we would try and present the story as 
written so that they would have to do the minimum amount of work. And also we 
learnt things about deadlines - you could manage to get your story quite 
prominent on the news depending on how you leaked it. Or if you gave an 
exclusive or you gave somebody more details than others…if a journalist 
continually messed us around or misrepresented what we were saying I would just 
cease to give that journalist invitations to press conferences and that would hurt 
that journalist…Not only did we send out statements but we learnt that when you 
send out statements you then phoned up the newspaper…Then you monitor the 
newspaper and you chase it up…“What‟s happening to our statement?” “Where‟s 
it going?” We did all of those things. 
 
Morrison also makes it clear that he sought to bring a more image conscious approach 
into the republican movement‟s media relations especially in respect to broadcast 
interviews. These became much more carefully stage managed and Morrison made sure it 
was always hand picked Sinn Féin representatives who were interviewed. He states: 
Instead of Panorama interviewing an IRA spokesperson in silhouette wearing a 
hood which is a very bad image. Which is a terrorist image. It was far better for 
the republican cause if they were interviewing me or someone like me who was 
giving an opinion and analysing why the IRA was doing the things that it was 
doing…[T]he subliminal affect on the English audience was that these are no 
longer sinister shadowy people; these are people that have an articulate position. 
 
His appointment as editor of Republican News was also to turn out to be a very 
significant in the internal power struggles which lay ahead for Sinn Féin. The newspaper 
was an important organ for the republican movement in its effort to communicate with its 
own supporters although when Morrison took over it was very under-resourced. As 
Devenney recollects: 
The Republican News at that time was almost like a local news-sheet. It wasn‟t 
the professional publication that people see today because of resources …we 
didn‟t have any photographers at the time – it was all voluntary, people came in 
and assisted us by giving us photographs. But we couldn‟t say, like other 
newspapers, to a photographer „Go and take a picture‟. 
 All this changed however, and Morrison‟s importance and influence increased, when in 
1979 the republican newspapers An Phoblacht [The Nation] and Republican News 
merged. The significance of the newly merged paper can be measured in its rapid growth 
into a 12-18 page format, a 30,000 weekly distribution and the fact that even the British 
government eventually used it to try to reach the republican mass audience. Moloney 
(2007) notes that the merger of the paper was also a success for Gerry Adams, bringing 
him further power by isolating the former An Phoblacht editor Gerry O‟Hare and his 
wing of the republican movement. It meant that the republican movement had one main 
media organ and that it therefore now spoke with one voice. It also meant that 
republicanism was arguably now clearly moving beyond merely adopting the limited 
propaganda of the deed approach to communication. As Picard (1989) points out: “well 
established and supported groups that employ terrorism often operate their own media to 
publicise their efforts among supporters and group members” (p. 20).  
Media ban 
Finally it is worth noting that the merged republican newspaper was to become 
even more significant when the UK followed the Republic of Ireland in introducing a 
broadcasting ban in 1988. The Irish Minister who introduced the ban in 1976, Conor 
Cruise O‟Brien, rejected the argument that Sinn Féin were a legitimate political party and 
denied them all broadcast media access in the Republic of Ireland, labelling them “a PR 
agency for a murder gang” (Wilkinson 1997, p. 61). The British government led by Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher imposed a broadcasting ban on Sinn Féin from October 1988 
to the September 1994 in order, as she put it, to starve IRA/Sinn Féin of the „oxygen of 
publicity‟. While the use of sub-titles and voice over made the broadcasting ban an issue 
of ridicule for some, it did have a negative impact on Sinn Féin. Richard McAuley 
suggests that the ban had a significant impact on the republican movement‟s media 
relations and points to a survey Danny Morrison conducted of media coverage before and 
after the ban was imposed. McAuley states: 
In the previous two years the number of interviews done by Sinn Féin with the 
broadcast media namely the BBC, UTV and Downtown [radio] had run into the 
hundreds. In the same period after the broadcast ban it was a handful the 
broadcast restrictions were very clever in that they didn‟t say that you couldn‟t do 
an interview with me and broadcast it you just couldn‟t use my voice… I don‟t 
think we overcame the issue of censorship we probably didn‟t even hold our own.  
 
However it should be noted that the republican movement was a fundamentally 
different organisation by the end of the 1980s than the republican movement at end of the 
1970s. Sinn Féin was now engaged in electoral politics and this was a shift in strategy 
and policy which changed the nature of the organisation fundamentally. To understand 
why this transformation occurred we must go back to 1981 and assess what was perhaps 
the most important event of the whole conflict for the republican movement, and perhaps 
also in many ways for Northern Ireland as a whole, the „Hunger Strikes‟.  
Sinn Féin and the development of political PR 
The republican movement by the end of the 1970s was to some extent on the back 
foot with the substantial investment in military intelligence gathering sanctioned by the 
Labour Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Roy Mason, having the effect of 
disrupting the organisation. It was however clear that they could not be completely 
defeated militarily by the British Army either. The cycle of violence continued with 
political assassinations and sectarian killings, particularly by loyalist paramilitaries, 
characterising this period. In 1979 a Conservative party administration led by Margaret 
Thatcher was elected in the UK and this did ultimately result in a change of strategy for 
the republican movement. The Thatcher government‟s key policies in respect to Northern 
Ireland focused on putting  more resources into defeating the IRA militarily while at the 
same time rigorously reinforcing the rules on political status for IRA prisoners who had 
been protesting against the withdrawal of „Special Category Status‟ since 1976. The 
protest escalated after it became clear that the new British Government would not 
negotiate on this issue and republican prisoners would continue to be treated as criminals 
rather that „prisoners of war‟.  
The „Hunger Strikes‟   
As noted above the republican movement has always attempted to present itself as 
the „oppressed‟ fighting for national self-determination against a colonial power. The 
1981 „Hunger Strikes‟ which led to the deaths of 10 prisoners and the election of their 
leader Bobby Sands as a British MP brought this struggle to an international audience and 
garnered enormous support from around the world. According to Brendan MacFarlane, 
the prisoner‟s PRO at the time, the decision to go on hunger strike was initially taken by 
the prisoners inside the Maze prison to resist the prisons policy in respect to republicans 
in Northern Ireland jails. It was not initially part of an IRA/Sinn Féin strategy and was in 
fact opposed by the IRA leadership outside the prison. Nevertheless despite internal 
dissension over the strategy the Sinn Féin PR team moved quickly to secure the best 
coverage. Danny Morrison when comparing the media relations effort surrounding the 
hunger strikes to that of „Bloody Sunday‟ ten years earlier suggests that Sinn Féin were 
able to draw on what they had learnt from the previous decade: 
So when you look back you can see that there‟s a lot of missed opportunities. I 
mean for example, look at Bloody Sunday. The publicity that came from Bloody 
Sunday, it happened by the local people themselves. Whereas years later for 
example if the British Army shot somebody dead I would be trying to get a 
photograph of that person to the Press Association. ... And a photograph is an 
embarrassment. You see in 1981 when Bobby Sands went on hunger strike and 
when Bobby stood for election. We brought out a poster of Bobby where he has 
long hair and he‟s smiling. It was actually taken in jail, when he was in jail the 
first time in 1973. But he looks like a hippy in this photograph, he looks quite 
pleasant, quite affable, and dignified. We got that image around the world and the 
British government realised “Fucking hell, this is bad for us.” So they get on to 
the Press Association and they try to get the media to use a photograph of Bobby 
Sands when he had been arrested with a number plate beneath him, like a mug-
shot. But it was too late, we‟d got out there in front. You can see the importance. 
We wouldn‟t have had that knowledge back in 1971, to put photographs out.  
 
The media coverage generated from the hunger strikes demonstrates that the 
republican movement had developed a much more professional PR approach to media 
relations compared to the previous decade. Rolston and Miller (1996) note that there were 
47 negative editorials of British policy in the American media alone during the hunger 
strike period. The exposure of the conflict to an international audience was significant but 
the Hunger Strike‟s most important outcome was that it “made it possible, much sooner 
than anyone imagined, for Sinn Féin to fully embrace electoral politics” (Moloney 2007, 
p. 210).  
Electoral Politics 
One thing that all of our interviewees are in agreement on is the crucial significance of 
the election of the leader of the hunger strikers Bobby Sands as a Member of the British 
Parliament. Sinn Féin‟s official policy at the time was abstentionism in respect to both 
the British House of Commons and the Irish parliament, Dáil Éireann. Westminster was 
regarded as having no jurisdiction over Northern Ireland and official policy on the Dáil 
(although most disavowed it in private) was that it was a puppet of the British state.  Sinn 
Féin boycotted both political institutions and when it did stand candidates in either 
jurisdiction it always described this activity as a „political intervention‟. Gerry Adams 
makes this clear: “Bobby‟s election was an intervention as opposed to an electoral 
strategy, but his success accelerated that entire process.” This point that Sands‟ election 
was the beginning of a new phase in Sinn Féin‟s thinking about the conflict and its 
strategic approach is made by several interviewees. Jim Gibney makes clear his belief 
that without the hunger strikes, and subsequent elections of prisoners, Sinn Féin may not 
have gambled on going down the political route: “We took a risk in putting Bobby Sands 
forward, because there was always a chance that he could‟ve been defeated.” However 
Gibney notes that electoral success transformed Sinn Féin thinking in regard to traditional 
politics: “By the mid 80s Sinn Féin, the political leadership of Sinn Féin is beginning to 
see the importance of elections as a way of building a political party right across the 
island.” Danny Morrison, however, rejects the notion that putting the hunger striking 
prisoners up for election was in any way part of some overall planned political or PR 
strategy that Sinn Féin had worked out to propel the party into electoral politics. 
Reflecting on the period Morrison states:  
[A] lot of journalists and writers who come here and look back are looking back 
with the advantage of hindsight. They only see history as it developed and not the 
difficulties and the difficult decisions people had to make at any one time. And 
they think, “Look how clever the Republicans were. They got Bobby Sands to 
stand and he got elected. They got Owen Carron to stand and he got elected, then 
they stood in the Assembly elections, then Gerry Adams got elected as MP the 
next year.” It‟s as if everything was part of a pearl on a string that followed 
logically and it didn‟t happen like that. It was high risk putting up Bobby Sands. 
If he had lost that election Thatcher would have said “Even your own people 
reject you.” 
 
Internal communication 
Picard (1989) suggests that sometimes a terrorist group‟s “publicity attempts can 
also single out specific audiences… In some cases the publicity is aimed at terrorist 
colleagues” (Picard 1989, p. 17). Moving into electoral politics was a far from easy 
transition for the republican movement and the chief opposition to such a strategy lay 
within the organisation. This meant that in some respects the key communication effort 
for the Sinn Féin leadership for much of the 1980s was focused on its internal audience. 
Spencer (2006) argues that one shouldn‟t underestimate the enormous struggle which 
occurred within the republican movement in regard to the change from an abstentionist 
policy to one of political engagement.  He notes: “The leadership of Sinn Féin had to sell 
the idea to the republican grassroots that the political path could deliver more in terms of 
future goals and this demanded careful planning and repeated manoeuvring within 
leadership meetings, which faced stiff opposition throughout” (Spencer 2006, p. 362).  
All changes to Sinn Féin party policy must be passed by the membership at the 
annual Ard Feis (party conference) and this forum became the key site of a struggle 
between those who wished to move the party toward mainstream democratic politics and 
those who opposed this. It was the scene of many set piece persuasive attempts to change 
the policy on abstentionism. In 1981 Danny Morrison famously made an impassioned 
plea to push through this fundamental change to the Sinn Féin constitution. Morrison 
declared „will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and an armalite in the 
other we take power in Ireland‟. Commenting on the famous sound-bite of Morrison‟s 
Gerry Adams notes: 
I was never comfortable with the remark, it was a very internalised remark, … it 
was a remark which Danny made to other republicans and more importantly, I 
suppose, I understand this retrospectively, but I didn‟t at that time, was that a 
small group of people led by Ruairi [O‟Bradaigh – former Sinn Féin president] 
and others were totally opposed to any involvement in electoralism apart from 
interventions and you can see why that was the case, because clearly that took you 
in a certain direction … but I mean there‟s no other way to go, if you want to win 
a struggle, you can only do it by winning the maximum amount of support 
possible. 
 
After several years of internal debate and negotiation the policy change was finally 
agreed at the Ard Feis in November 1986 when a resolution proposed by Martin 
McGuinness was carried by the required two-thirds majority. Sinn Féin would no longer 
abstain from taking their seats in the Dáil however, while they would stand for election 
for the British Parliament, they would abstain from taking up their seats at Westminster. 
This fundamental change to a policy which had existed for over 60 years had an 
important impact on PR strategy and tactics. Sinn Féin had been behaving more like a 
mainstream political party throughout the first half of the 1980‟s, for example investing 
heavily in local (cumann) and constituency level organisation and contesting seriously 
council elections. But this policy change, as Adams hints at in the quote above, meant it 
could now set its sights on attempting to become the biggest nationalist political party in 
Northern Ireland. Political PR, in the sense that it is understood by most political parties 
in democratic societies, increasingly came to characterise Sinn Féin‟s communication 
activities. This is demonstrated in the final phase of the republican movements‟ 
development examined in this study when it disengaged from violent struggle and 
engaged in peace making and peace building. 
The PR of peace-making 
The Peace Process 
While the key policy shifts traced in this study were highly significant and 
ultimately changed the nature and role of Sinn Féin profoundly it should be remembered 
that even in the latter years of the 1980s the IRA was still heavily engaged in political 
violence. So while it could be argued that the most significant change in the republican 
movement was the embracing of electoral politics it is clear that ending the „armed 
struggle‟ involved just as much effort in respect to persuasive internal communication 
and PR. Jim Gibney describes this internal communication process within the republican 
movement: 
The individual activists of the organisation had to be contacted on an ongoing 
basis, they needed to know what was happening to the peace process, they needed 
to be involved in so far as they could be involved in making decisions about the 
development of the peace process and as often as possible, especially around big 
decisions that had to be made, they needed to be brought together and the political 
thinking behind the strategic move needed to be put to them as well.  
 
At the same time that this internal communication effort was going on, Sinn Féin also had 
to demonstrate to this audience that a peace strategy could achieve political results. 
Spencer (2006) notes that its external media relations and its internal communication are 
intimately related. He suggests:   
Sinn Féin‟s ability to shape news is connected both to the structural cohesion of 
the party (where internal planning, organisation and discipline are key to decision 
making) and a sophisticated understanding of communication skills. …The 
organisation, presentation and distribution of messages, along with intense 
dialogue and control to avoid splits and open dissent (Spencer 2006, p. 380). 
 
In January 1994 Irish premier Albert Reynolds lifted the 18 year old ban on radio and 
television interviews with Sinn Féin in the Republic of Ireland and Moloney (2007) notes 
this took Sinn Féin closer to “being treated like a normal, respectable political party” (p. 
419). The long road to „legitimacy‟ which in many ways had begun with the election of 
Bobby Sands took another major step forward when, against the wishes of the British 
government, in February 1994 US President Clinton granted Gerry Adams a visa to visit 
the USA after a 20 year ban. These initiatives and the ongoing negotiations between the 
republican leadership and the British Conservative government led to the announcement 
of an IRA ceasefire in August 1994. Adams‟s work in America throughout 1994 and the 
publicity he gained are testament to his networking abilities and his teams‟ PR skills. Bill 
Flynn (Chairman of Mutual Life Insurance Company) who had facilitated the visit of 
Gerry Adams and recalled “He was on coast-to-coast TV programmes, he was a 
tremendous hit…a thoughtful, reasonable, thinking person not a “terrorist”…curiously 
what made the thing a PR success of the first order was the fact he had been drowned out 
by the British rules and regulations” (Feeney 2002, p. 404).  
The „Good Friday Agreement‟ 
The ceasefire negotiated with John Major‟s Conservative government was an 
uneasy one and the IRA broke the truce in 1996 to launch several high profile bombing 
attacks on the British mainland which caused over £1 billion worth of damage (Dillon 
1996, p. 292). However, electoral change at Westminster gave fresh impetus to the peace 
process in Northern Ireland and when this was combined with intense internal 
communication efforts within the republican movement it led to a permanent IRA 
ceasefire in June 1997. It was the election in 1997 of Tony Blair‟s Labour government in 
London and Bertie Ahern‟s Fianna Fail /Progressive Democrats coalition in Dublin that 
stimulated the movement toward the „Good Friday Agreement‟, the most significant 
constitutional change in Ireland since the partition of the island in 1920. On the 10
th
 April 
1998 the Good Friday Agreement was signed. The corner stone of the agreement was the 
setting up of a new devolved legislature in which unionists and nationalists would share 
power. In addition a North-South Ministerial Council was established to oversee a series 
of cross border bodies.  
Spencer (2006) notes that Sinn Féin‟s media management expertise was 
especially evident in the final hours of negotiations before the Good Friday agreement 
was signed. He points out that, “in comparison to Unionists who would appeal to the 
cameras too quickly and in doing so reveal a certain desperation which symbolised a lack 
of confidence and control, Adams and McGuiness would use the power of non-verbal 
communication to reflect the opposite” (p. 364). According to Spencer, at this crucial 
stage Sinn Féin used the watching media outside the talk‟s venue to broadcast messages 
to different audiences. He observes: 
Rather than merely running to the cameras to appeal about elements of the 
agreement which would be unacceptable, Adams and McGuiness would often 
walk around the car park smiling to each other and looking relaxed. This was 
picked up by the cameras and screened to audiences who interpreted the signs 
quite differently. For republican constituencies the signs were that Sinn Féin were 
doing well in the talks (although this was, of course, a performance with political 
intent), but for unionists the opposite perception was more likely. Images of Sinn 
Féin representatives smiling could only mean for many unionists that the talks 
were going badly, and would lead to intensified pressure on unionist participants 
to do more in the talks‟ (Spencer 2006, p. 364).   
 
The result of the all island referendum on the Good Friday Agreement was a 71% 
yes vote in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland it was 94%. With the signing 
of the Good Friday Agreement by most of the major political actors and the endorsement 
by the electorate both north and south of the border Northern Ireland gradually began to 
move from being a conflict to a post-conflict society. A peace building phase began in 
Northern Ireland and although there have been setbacks and sporadic acts of violence by 
dissidents the peace has held and the devolved power sharing institutions are developing 
and consolidating.  
Conclusions 
Previous research on the use of PR and publicity techniques by terrorist groups 
has traced specific kinds of trajectories in regard to the kinds of PR employed. So, for 
example, Picard (1989) suggests that a common pattern is:  
A group that begins using large-scale propaganda of the deed actions may reduce 
such violence if the group‟s cause or the group itself receives some recognition by 
the public, authorities, and other parties...Among terrorist groups, the larger and 
more organized groups employ more and highly sophisticated publicity 
techniques intent on portraying their continuing – although usually smaller scale – 
violent acts as rational and justified‟ (Picard 1989, p. 15). 
 
Our findings would suggest that this is only partially true in the case of the republican 
movement which, while it did develop a highly skilled PR capacity, also continued to 
employ large scale propaganda of the deed type actions almost up until the actual 
negotiations surrounding the Good Friday Agreement in late 1997. Indeed the year before 
the agreement they were still employing symbolic and economically costly 
„spectaculars‟, in the form of massive bombs in London and Manchester to deliver  
„messages‟ to the British Government and people. Picard also argues that some terrorist 
groups, understanding the on-going nature of political struggle, strategically plan their 
campaign to begin with significant levels of violence, “then reduce its scale and replace 
the propaganda of the deed with other forms of publicity and lower levels of violence, 
and may indicate that they will give up perpetrating terrorist acts in exchange for official 
recognition” (Picard 1989, p.21). The participants in our study would reject the notion 
that the republican movements‟ development from the violent armed struggle of the early 
1970s through to the peace process of the 1990s was a carefully planned political and PR 
project. Instead unforeseen opportunities and developments were taken advantage off and 
policies and strategies developed over the long period of conflict which would have been 
unthinkable to the 1970s abstentionist republican movement determined to remove the 
British state from Northern Ireland at the point of a gun.    
It is interesting to note that the key PR figures in the republican movement during 
the Troubles were also at the heart of republican strategic decision making, they were 
part of what Grunig et al (2002, p.141) refer to as the “dominant coalition”. Arguably this 
allowed the leadership of the republican movement to navigate away from political 
violence and toward peacemaking while at the same time keeping its membership intact, 
its sympathizers on-board and its electoral base growing. It is clear that key PR skills in 
respect to both media management and internal communication were crucial in 
communicating this policy and strategy development. Richard McAuley notes:  
We were always very conscious of PR and its importance... We were always 
looking for different angles and different ways to get the message of the party 
across. As we tried to develop the party and build Sinn Féin then the party 
leadership at different levels became of conscious of having the need to have PR 
people within the structure. 
 
Aside from sharing this notion of the centrality of PR to an organisation‟s success 
it should be noted that there is little conceptual agreement with other features of the 
Grunigian paradigm. There is, for example, no articulation of a two-way symmetrical 
approach to communication except when that communication concerns its internal 
stakeholders. Jim Gibney describes a conception of PR where evaluation is central but it 
is very much a one-way communication model that he envisages: 
[B]uilt into any PR system has to be review, assessment and so on…its just the 
ABC, if you‟re into publicity, whether its armed propaganda or ordinary publicity 
then yes you have to build a review mechanism into it, an assessment mechanism 
into it to be able to say, well did we get our message out there yesterday or not?  
Was our message understood or misunderstood?  
 
Ultimately it is PR as advocacy or propaganda that is articulated as the main 
understanding and definition of the activity by the participants in this study. Richard 
McAuley puts this view most forcefully: “I don‟t believe you can distinguish between PR 
and propaganda...its basically all the same thing, its about selling a message and the 
message can be a good message or a bad message and its how you present it, its how you 
package it, its how you sell it.” 
Finally, it is clear that more generally the history of the republican movement in 
Northern Ireland doesn‟t adhere particularly closely to the patterns identified in previous 
theoretical accounts of terrorist campaigns. For instance Ross and Gurr (1989) argue: 
With a handful of revolutionary exceptions, political terrorists rarely achieve their 
announced objectives. It is often the case, though, that some progress toward 
some of their objectives is realized….Of course such efforts at accommodation 
virtually never acknowledge the demands of groups using terrorism, but rather are 
addressed to grievances that are expressed by more moderate spokesmen using 
less extreme means‟ (p. 413). 
 
This notion of the typical trajectory of political terrorist groups doesn‟t fit 
particularly well with the story of the republican movement and in some ways the 
opposite of what Ross and Gurr state has occurred. While they have not achieved their 
overall political objective of a United Ireland outside of British jurisdiction they have 
made substantial progress as a political movement. Sinn Féin is now the largest party, in 
respect to electoral success, in the nationalist or republican tradition having supplanted 
the traditionally more moderate spokesmen for that tradition. In fact, it achieved the 
highest share of the vote of all political parties in Northern Ireland in the 2010 general 
election (26%). They also sit as joint leaders of the power sharing government of the new 
devolved legislature in Northern Ireland. In addition the Good Friday Agreement 
guarantees a constitutional arrangement which contains an all-Ireland element of 
governance, the North-South Ministerial Council which decides on a range of cross-
border issues. Arguably a key reason for these achievements, and for the continuing 
success of Sinn Féin, is that the leadership of the organisation took very seriously the 
need to develop a well organised, well resourced, PR capacity both in respect to media 
relations and internal organisational communication.  
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i
 Interviews carried out by Andy Purcell, Carla Heatley and Liam O‟Connor. 
ii
 Internment was introduced in August 1971 and ended in December 1975. 
